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ABSTRACT. The present paper compares the performance in terms of second order ac-
curate welfare of opportunistic non-linear Taylor rules and with respect to traditional linear
Taylor rules. The macroeconomic model representing the benchmark for the analysis in-
cludes capital accumulation (with quadratic costs of adjustment), price rigidities (quadratic
approach), along the standard New-Keynesian approach. The model is solved up to second
order approximation and welfare is evaluated according to several criteria (conditional to the
non-stochastic steady state, unconditional, and according to a linear ad hoc function). The
results show that: (i) the opportunistic rule is a Pareto improvement with respect to other
monetary policy rules traditionally considered in the literature; (ii) the computation of wel-
fare costs reveals that the burden of adjustment is almost entirely on labor supply fluctuations;
(iii) increasing the degree of price rigidities and the degree of competition in the final goods
markets, makes the opportunistic rule even more preferable with respect to the alternatives.
Business Cycle statistics for the model with opportunistic rule show a large volatility in labor
supply, with a limited volatility for the nominal interest rate.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Modern central banks can adopt two approaches to pursue a disinflationary course of monetary
policy. They can announce a final inflation target and set the policy rate accordingly. This has been
called ‘deliberate’ approach to disinflation. The view advocated by Federal Reserve Governor
Lawrence Meyer, instead, suggests that a central bank should wait for favorable unforeseen shocks
to lower the inflation rate when inflation is moderate but above the central bank’s target (see
Meyer, 1996). The ‘opportunistic’ approach proposes that the central bank behaves in a nonlinear
way. Until the desired reduction of inflation has occurred, the central bank should focus on
counteracting any increase in inflation and on stabilizing the output gap. Once the disinflation has
taken place, monetary policy should prevent the inflation rate from returning to the past levels.
Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) provide the theoretical foundations for the opportunistic ap-
proach. They show that a simple opportunistic rule for monetary arises from the optimizing
behavior of a central bank with history-dependent intermediate target for inflation. The history-
dependence in the loss function of the central bank provides the reason for path-dependence in
the response of the policy rate to inflation. The loss function also includes absolute deviations
of output from its natural level. The interaction between the objective on output and the objec-
tive on inflation generates nonlinearity in the optimal policy rule. Aksoy, Orphanides, Small,
Wilcox, and Wieland (2003) consider the long-run implications of the opportunistic approach.
They compare the stochastic distributions of inflation and the output gap arising from a linear and
an opportunistic rule in an estimated rational-expectations model.
In this paper we focus on the business cycle properties of the opportunistic approach to disin-
flation. We set up a calibrated New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and nominal and
real rigidities. The public sector is modeled as a simple rule for lump-sum taxes like in Leeper
(1991). We include three sources of exogenous fluctuations in the form of stochastic shocks to
productivity, firms markup and government spending. We solve the model through the second-
order Taylor approach developed by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004). This allows us to compute
optimized monetary policy rules by maximizing alternative measures of consumer welfare. We
compare the impulse responses and business cycle statistics of the model economy under a set of
maximized linear rules for monetary policy and under the opportunistic rule. The results indicate
that the opportunistic rule allows to reach an higher level of welfare if compared with a tradi-
tional linear Taylor’ type rule. Our optimal coefficients for the optimal opportunistic rule are not
too dissimilar from those obtained by Aksoy, Orphanides, Small, Wilcox, and Wieland (2003),
implying an high coefficient on the nonlinear part of the rule a strong interest rate inertia and no
response to output fluctuations. The cost for the opportunistic rule is almost entirely in terms of
higher labor supply fluctuations. On the other hand, by adopting a rule where monetary authority
is committed to an explicit path of disinflation (deliberate disinflation rule in our language), the
welfare gains are higher both with respect to traditional Taylor’s type rule and with respect to the
opportunistic rule itself. However, this occurs at the cost of an higher volatility of consumption
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and employment than would have been obtained under the other rules. The highest volatility of
consumption is obtained under the optimal money growth rule. If we rank our rules according to
an ad hoc loss function, imposing a linear trade-off between inflation and output stabilization, we
find that the rankings for the various policy rules is completely different from the microfounded
welfare function. Under this loss function, the opportunistic rule delivers a welfare value much
higher than any other policy rules.
The robustness exercise conducted by raising the degree of price rigidity associated to a lower
degree of monopoly power in the final goods markets, shows that the opportunistic rule allows to
reach the highest possible welfare value among the other rules.
A final word is about impulse-response analysis. Nominal interest rate after a positive technol-
ogy shock shows a moderate response, inserting an higher persistence in output response. After a
government (positive) shock, the interest rate moderately falls, causing a modest increase in con-
sumption (via money demand effect). With this response, our model supports the view by which
the increase in public (non productive) government expenditure crowds out private consumption,
but crowds in private investment.
A further point, albeit technical, of the present paper is about the computation of conditional
moments. In the appendix we provide a closed form expression of the conditional moments based
on the second order solution of the model. This result makes possible to compute the second order
matrix, without using recursion, which could cause, instead, spurious higher order terms.
We believe that the present results are encouraging and calls for further generalization and
extensions, given the empirical importance of non-linear rules, as possible explanation for the
inertial of Central Banks.
The European Central Bank (ECB) is often supposed to follow a non-linear rule like the op-
portunistic one considered in the present paper. The intuition behind that relies on the prescription
issued in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) which fixes the duties of the ECB. According to
SGP, ECB should target inflation rate ahead of any other goals. Thus, after any inflationary shock,
ECB should react in order to bring the inflation back to the target (prescribed as to be 2 per cent
on an yearly basis). Since nothing else is specified with respect to either goals or situations where
inflation is not increasing, this can be interpreted as a non-linear policy rules such that nominal
rates are strongly raised if inflation raises, but they do not decrease proportionately to the infla-
tion reductions. The opportunistic rule tries to formalize this inertial pattern of modern central
banking.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model economy. Section 3 dis-
cusses the monetary policy rules that we study. Section 4 considers the equilibrium conditions.
The calibration strategy is presented in section 5. Section 6 deals with the computational aspects
of this work, including the approximation technique to the first-order conditions and the method
for evaluating welfare. The results are discussed in section 7. Section 8 proposes some concluding
remarks.
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2. THE MODEL
The structure of the model economy is standard in the New-Keynesian tradition of Woodford
(2002). We include money demand through the money-in-the-utility function approach studied by
Feenstra (1986), and quadratic capital-adjustment costs like Kim (2000). Nominal price rigidity
arises from quadratic-adjustment costs from changing prices.
2.1. Households
The model economy is populated by a large number of infinitely-lived agents indexed on the real
line, i ∈ [0, 1], each maximizing the following stream of utility
Uit =
∞∑
t=0
βtu(cit,mit, `it)
subjected to the following specification for the instantaneous utility function
u (cit,mit, `it) =
1
1− 1σ

[
ac
µ−1
µ
it + (1− a)
(
Mit
Pt
)µ−1
µ
] µ
µ−1
(1− `it)ξ

(1− 1σ )
The utility function considers money in a weakly separable form with respect to consumption Cit.
Basically, consumption and real money balances Mit/Pt are taken together via a CES aggregator
type, as described by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000). The advantage of such approach
relies on the cross substitution effects between consumption and money derived from the weak
separability between money and consumption. It is worth to note that the equivalence between
money-in-the utility, transaction costs and cash-in-advance models has been proved by Feenstra
(1986).
The i-th household budget constraint (in real terms) is given by
cit +
Mit −Mit−1
Pt
+
Bit
Pt
+ invit
[
1 +
φK
2
(
invit
kit
)2]
≤
qitkit + wit`it + Rt−1
Bit−1
Pt
− τ lst +
∫ 1
0
ηi (j) Ωt (j) dj
Households’ income derives from: i) labor income in the form of wit`it, with wit real wage per
unit of labor effort `it; ii) capital income qitkit, with qit rental rate on capital stock kit; (iii)
proceedings from investment in government bonds Rt−1Bit−1/Pt, where Rt is the gross nominal
rate, and Bit is the stock of government’s bonds held by i-th household. Each agent participates
in the profit of the firm producing good j via a constant share ηi (j). We assume that this share
is constant and out of the control of the single agent. Households also pay taxes in the form of
lump-sum transfers τ lst to the government.
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Households allocate their wealth among money Mit, (nominal) bonds Bit and (real) invest-
ment invit. In order to reduce the high investment volatility typical of the RBC, we follow the
suggestion of Kim (2000) and introduce an investment adjustment cost in the quadratic form. The
assumption of quadratic cost of price adjustment simplifies algebra and delivers coherent results.
The evolution of capital accumulation is governed by the following equation
kit+1 = (1− δ)kit + invit (1)
Given the existence of differentiated goods and different labor inputs, there exists an intra-
temporal optimization program on the final goods-sector.
The are j varieties of final goods produced that are aggregated according to the constant-
elasticity of substitution technology proposed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
cit =
[∫
ω2
cit (j)
θ−1
θ dj
] θ
θ−1
where θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between different varieties of goods produced by each
j-th firm and cit (j) is the consumption of varieties j by i-th household. The constant elasticity of
substitution inverse demand function for j-th variety expressed by i-th household is
cit (j)
cit
=
[
Pt (j)
Pt
]−θ
where Pt (j) is the price of variety j and Pt is the general price index defined as
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt (j)
1−θ dj
] 1
1−θ
Aggregate consumption is defined as ct =
∫
ω1
citdi, after aggregating over the i ∈ ω1 households.
The aggregate demand for variety j can be written as
ct(j) + gt(j) = yt(j)
such that the individual demand curve takes the form
Pt(j) =
[
yt(j)
yt
]−1/θ
Pt (2)
2.2. Firms
We assume the existence of a large number of firms indexed by j ∈ ω2, each producing a single
variety. Each firm acts as a price taker with respect to the varieties supplied by other competitors.
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The production function is given by
yjt = zt (kjt)
α (`jt)
1−α − Φt (3)
where kjt and `jt are capital and labor inputs, respectively. We also introduce the exogenous
shocks
log zt= (1− ρz) log z + ρz log zt−1 + εzt
log Φt= (1− ρΦ) log Φ + ρΦ log Φt−1 + εΦt
There are quadratic cost of price adjustment a` la Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) specified as
ACPt (j) =
φP
2
(
Pt (j)
Pt−1 (j)
− pi
)2
yt
The optimal choice of labor and capital to be hired is described as the maximization of the
future stream of profit evaluated with the stochastic discount factor ρt
max
{Pt(j),kt(j),`t(j)}
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
λtΩt (j)
]
s. t. Ωt (j) = Pt (j) yjt −Wt`jt − Ptqtkjt − PtACPt (j)
given the demand for differentiated products in (2), and the production function (3).
2.3. Government
The government faces a standard flow budget constraint
Bjtdj + Ptτ lst +Mjt = Rt−1Bjt−1 + Ptgt +Mjt−1
Real total taxation is denoted as τt, and gt indicates total government spending. The government
issues one-period riskless (non-contingent) nominal bonds denoted by Dt. We also specify the
intertemporal budget constraint of the government
RtBjt ≤
∞∑
p=0
Et+p
(
1
Rt+p
)p[
Mjt+p −Mjt−1+p + Pt+pτ lst+p − Pt+pgt+p
]
As it is customary in the literature, we posit an exogenous path to public expenditure, by assuming
an AR(1) described by the following equation
log (gt) = (1− ρg) log(g) + ρg log (gt−1) + εgt
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with εgt+1 is i.i.d.∼ N
(
0, σ2g
)
.
The government flow budget constraint in equilibrium can be also re-written by defining the
total amount of government’s liabilities lt
lt :=
RtBt +Mt
Pt
In this case, the evolution of total liabilities is represented by the equation
lt =
Rtlt−1
pit
+Rt
(
gt − τ lst
)
−mt (Rt − 1)
An important feature of the present model, shared by other contributions, consists in a feed-
back rule for tax revenues of the type suggested by Leeper (1991). In what follows, we introduce
the fiscal rule
τ lst = ψ0 + ψ1 (lt−1 − l) + ψ2
[
gt +
(
Rt−1 − 1
Rt−1
)(
lt−1 −mt−1
pit
)]
The economic interpretation is that the government set taxes in order to stabilize the level of total
liabilities lt in real terms. The particular functional form assumed allows to distinguish between
two distinct forms of stabilization: a simple fiscal feedback rule a` la Leeper (1991), obtained by
setting ψ2 = 0, and a balanced budget rule when ψ1 = 0 and ψ2 = 1. In other words, taxes can
be adjusted to follow either a ‘minimal’ adjustment path, enough to avoid that the total amount of
government’s liabilities to explode, or a ’strong’ stabilization path, when taxes are immediately
adjusted according to a balanced budget rule.
3. MONETARY POLICY RULES
3.1. Linear benchmarks
We compare the macroeconomic performance of an array of simple rules for monetary policy that
have become standard in the literature. The celebrated specification proposed by Taylor (1993) is
the starting point for every study of monetary policy
log
[
it
i¯
]
= αpi
[pit
p¯i
]
+ αy log
[
yt
y¯
]
+ αR log
[
it
it−1
]
A critique of the previous rules is that their implementation requires an in-depth knowledge of the
long-run state of the model economy (see Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2003). To that hand, rules in
first-differences have been proposed to cope the problem that the deterministic steady states are
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unobservable
log
[
it
it−1
]
= αpi log
[
pit
pit−1
]
++αy log
[
yt
yt−1
]
Clarida, Galı´, and Gertler (2000) provide empirical evidence in favour of the proposition for which
U.S. monetary policy is described appropriately by a simple rule with forward-looking variables.
Woodford (2002) provides the conditions such that the forward-looking specification arises as the
optimal rule from a set of microfounded assumptions. Hence, we introduce the following
log
[
it
i¯
]
= αpiEt log
[pit+1
p¯i
]
+ αyEt log
[
yt+1
y¯
]
+ αR log
[
it
it−1
]
Since our model provides for a role for money demand, it is natural to consider also a simple rule
for money growth with respect to the steady state
log
[mt
m¯
]
= ρm log
[mt−1
m¯
]
The above equation introduces a persistent money supply rule, as it is customary in the current
literature.
3.2. Opportunistic monetary policy
Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) formalize the idea underlying the ‘opportunistic approach to disin-
flation’ with a policy rule that is both time-dependent and nonlinear. The central bank pursues an
intermediate target of inflation p˜it such that the closer current inflation to p˜it, the stronger the de-
fense of the lower inflation level against past inflation targets. The inflation target p˜it is a weighted
average of long-run inflation p¯i and inherited past inflation piht
p˜it := (1− λ) log[p¯i] + λpiht
The term piht is the source of history dependence for monetary policy. Nonlinearity arises from
the existence of a range of inflation deviations from the intermediate target within which output
stabilization is the primary objective of monetary policy. The larger the deviation of inflation
from p˜it, the stronger the focus on price stability.
The opportunistic policy rule proposed by Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) takes the form
log [it/¯i] = κ0 log [yt/y¯] + G (log[pit]− p˜it) + κ3 log [it−1/¯i]
where hats denote deviations from the deterministic steady states, and G(·) is represented by the
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discontinuos function
G(pit − p˜it) :=

κ1(log[pit]− p˜it − κ2) if (log[pit]− p˜i) > κ2
0 if κ2 ≥ (log[pit]− p˜i) ≥ −κ2
κ1(log[pit]− p˜it + κ2) if (log[pit]− p˜i) < −κ2
The set of deviations from the inflation target such that G = 0 defines a ‘zone of inaction’. If there
is a drop in inflation below this zone, the central bank acts to prevent inflation from returning at
the higher level of the past. In the intentions of the proponents of the opportunistic approach to
disinflation, the zone of inaction defines the scope for opportunism. In the numerical solution
of the model, we follow Aksoy, Orphanides, Small, Wilcox, and Wieland (2003), and use the
following twice continuously-differentiable approximation of G
G(·) ≈ κ1
[
0.05(log[pit]− p˜it) + 0.475
(
−κ2 + log[pit]− p˜it +
(
(−κ2 + log[pit]− p˜it)2
)0.51)
+0.475
(
κ2 + log[pit]− p˜it −
(
(κ2 + log[pit]− p˜it)2
)0.51)]
Since we are concerned with the U.S. economy, we assign the same parameter values to the
approximated G that Aksoy, Orphanides, Small, Wilcox, and Wieland (2003) use. There is a
slightly-positive slope even when inflation is within the zone of inaction. The numerical algorithm
maximizes over a grid for κ0, κ1 and κ2.
4. EQUILIBRIUM AND AGGREGATION
DEFINITION 1: A symmetric monopolistically-competitive equilibrium consists of stationary se-
quences of prices {Pt}∞t=0 := {pi∗t , R∗t , w∗t , r∗t }∞t=0, real quantities {Qt}∞t=0 := {{Qht }∞t=0, {Qft }∞t=0,
{Qgt }∞t=0}, with {Qht }∞t=0 := {c∗t , `∗t , k∗t+1, i∗t ,m∗t , d∗t }∞t=0, {Qft }∞t=0 := {y∗t , k∗t , `∗t }∞t=0, {Qgt }∞t=0 :=
{g∗t , τ ls∗t ,m∗t , d∗t }∞t=0 and exogenous shocks {Et}∞t=0 := {zt , gt }∞t=0 that aggregate over ω1 =
[0, 1] and ω2 = [0, 1], that are bounded in a neighborhood of the steady state, and such that:
(i) given prices {Pt}∞t=0 and shocks {Et}∞t=0, {Qht }∞t=0 is a solution to the representative
household’s problem;
(ii) given prices {Pt}∞t=0 and shocks {Et}∞t=0, {Qft }∞t=0 is a solution to the representative firms’
problem;
(iii) given quantities {Qt}∞t=0 and shocks {Et}∞t=0, {Pt}∞t=0 clears the market for goods, factors
of production, money and bonds
y∗t = c
∗
t + inv
∗
t + g
∗
t +AC
k∗
t +AC
P∗
t
(iv) given quantities {Qt}∞t=0, prices {Pt}∞t=0 and shocks {Et}∞t=0, {Qgt }∞t=0 and satisfy the
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flow budget constraint of the government;
(v) fiscal policy is set according to a simple rule for lump-sum taxes;
(vi) the central bank sets the nominal interest rate according to a simple policy rule.
5. CALIBRATION
The parameters are calibrated on quarterly data for the US economy. We assume that households
have an intertemporal discount rate of 0.996. They devote 1/4 of their time to labour activities at
the steady state. The weight on the consumption objective in the consumption objective is 0.993.
We assume that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 1/3, which lies on the boundary of the
range of values used in the RBC literature (see Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2003). The calibration
of the other parameters in the utility function is consistent with a consumption-output ratio of
0.57, and a money-output ratio of 0.44 in the long run (see Table I). The nominal rate of interest
is 5% a year, and the inflation rate is 4.2%. Both figures are consistent with the U.S. postwar
experience.
We set the investment-output and capital-output ratios as 0.25 and 10.4, respectively. Capital
depreciates for 10% a year. Both the parameter φK in the adjustment cost for capital, and the
persistence of the markup shock are from Kim (2000). Capital income has a share of 1/3 in total
output. The elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods generates a steady-state markup
of approximately 10%. Stochastic productivity shocks are calibrated according to Chari, Kehoe,
and McGrattan (2000).
We assume that government spending is 14.8% of GDP. The calibration for the public-spending
shock is from Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003). The steady-state ratio between public debt and
output is 0.45. In the baseline calibration, we assume that lump-sum taxes evolve according to a
simple rule with φ2 = 0, and with a strong feedback on total government liabilities (φ1 = 0.8).
In the language of Leeper (1991), this gives rise to a regime with ‘passive fiscal policy’. This
assumption is relaxed at a later point to study the role of the policy mix.
6. COMPUTATIONAL ASPECTS
6.1. Welfare evaluation
Aggregate welfare is defined as the expected lifetime utility conditional on the initial distribution
of the state varibles s0
W0 := E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(st)
∣∣∣s0 ∼ (s,Ω)]
Although unappealing from the point of view of statistical theory, this way of conditioning is
based on the timing of events implicit in the New Keynesian model. Namely, the assumption that
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the stochastic shocks are realized at the beginning of every period. At the end of each period,
economic decisions are taken following the optimality conditions. In order to obtain an accurate
welfare evaluation, the conditional welfare function is approximated through a second-order Tay-
lor expansion around the distorted steady state. This requires computing the second-order Taylor
approximation to the system of nonlinear expectational equations from the first-order conditions.
We use the algorithm of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004) for the solution of the model, and the
formulas presented in Paustian (2003) for the approximation to intertemporal utility.
The welfare costs of alternative policies are measured as the permanent change in consump-
tion, relative to the steady state, that yields the expected utility level of the distorted economy.
Given steady states of consumption c¯ι and hours worked ¯`of the model ι, this translates into the
number ∆ιc such that
∞∑
t=0
βtu
(
[1 + ∆ιc] c¯, ¯`
)
=Wι0 (4)
where ι refers to the monetary-policy rule. Following Kollmann (2003), we decompose the con-
ditional welfare cost ∆ιc into two components denoted as ∆ιE and ∆ιV . Given the second-order
approximation to the utility function
u
(
[1 + ∆ιc] c¯, ¯`
) ≈ u (c¯, ¯`)+ (1− β) ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
E
[
cˆt − ¯``ˆ t|s0
]
− 1
2
VAR [cˆt|s0]
)
we compute the change in mean consumption ∆ιE that the household faces while giving up the
total fraction of certainty-equivalent consumption ∆ιc
u
(
[1 + ∆ιE ] c¯, ¯`
)
= u
(
c¯, ¯`
)
+ (1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
E [cˆt|s0]− ¯`E
[
ˆ`
t|s0
])
Since the solution method is non-certainty equivalent, we can also calculate the change in condi-
tional variance of consumption that is consistent with the total welfare cost of policies
u
(
[1 + ∆ιV ] c¯, ¯`
)
= u
(
c¯, ¯`
)− (1− β)1
2
∞∑
t=0
βtVAR [cˆt|s0] (5)
where hats denote log-deviations from the deterministic steady states. Kollmann (2003) points
out that the following relation holds
(1 + ∆ιc) = (1 + ∆
ι
E) (1 + ∆
ι
V ) (6)
We calculate ∆ιc and ∆ιV through 4 and 5, and ∆ιE through 6. Since there is no closed-form
solution for the infinite summations, we simulate the conditional moments for 2000 periods and
12 M. MARZO, I. STRID AND P. ZAGAGLIA
compute the discounted sum. Appendix 3 provides analytical formulas for computing the mo-
ments conditional on an initial state vector.
For the purpose of comparison with the literature, we also report the approximation to the
expectation of the one-period (unconditional) utility around the distorted steady states
W := E [u(st)]
The steady-state jump ∆ιU that yields the unconditional utility level can be computed from
u
(
[1 + ∆ιU ] c¯, ¯`
)
=Wι
It is well known since Kim and Kim (2003) that this welfare index produces incorrect rankings
of the policy rules, for it disregards the transition costs of moving from the deterministic to the
stochastic steady states.
6.2. Local validity of approximate solutions
Second-order perturbation methods are defined only around small neighbourhoods of the approx-
imation points, unless the approximated function is globally analytic (see Anderson, Levin, and
Swanson, 2004). Since the conditions for an analytic form of the policy function are hardly es-
tablishable, the problem of validity of the Taylor expansion remains. To that end, we impose an
ad hoc bound that restricts the stochastic steady state of the nominal interest rate to be arbitrarily
close to its deterministic counterpart
ln
(
R¯
)
> κσRˆt (7)
with a constant κ, and σRˆt as the unconditional variance of Rˆ. This constraint rules out policies
that are excessively aggressive. The reason is that large deviations of the nominal rate of interest
from the deterministic steady state are likely to prescribe violations of the zero bound at some
point in time. In what follows, we set κ = 2.
7. QUANTITATIVE RESULTS
Tables II-IV report the specifications of the optimized monetary and fiscal policy rules. The
feedback coefficients on the inflation targets for all the linear rules are higher than one, and larger
than the coefficients on the output objective (see Table II). Panel (a) shows that the welfare loss
is due to the variability of consumption. The mean dynamics of consumption and labour, instead,
produce gains with respect to the deterministic steady state. The forward-looking rule achieves
the same conditional welfare level as the standard rule. However, the prescribed policy mix
is very different. The optimized coefficient on inflation is less than half than for the standard
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rule, whereas the feedback coefficient identifies a fiscal policy rule more passive than under the
standard Taylor rule. The money-growth rule improves on the welfare level (see panel (a) of
Table IV). This is at the cost of a large variability in consumption. The optimal opportunistic rule
is similar to that computed by Aksoy, Orphanides, Small, Wilcox, and Wieland (2003). It entails
a large coefficient on the nonlinear part of the rule, strong interest-rate inertia and no response to
output fluctuations (see panel (a) of Table III).
The impulse responses for the optimized standard rule depict well-known results. A positive
productivity shock raises real output and lowers inflation (see figure 1(a)). Consumption and
investment rise with respect to the deterministic steady state. There is a liquidity effect, namely a
fall in the short-term interest rate triggers an increase in money holdings. In the literature there is a
debate on the reaction of the fraction of time devoted to work activities in the post-Volcker period.
Our model supports the idea that hours worked fall after a positive productivity shock. Figure
1(b) shows that a government-spending shock leads to an increase in output. However, public
(non-productive) spending crowds out private consumption, and crowds in private investment.
This indicates that our model subscribes to the interpretation of government spending shocks as
productivity shocks. Finally a markup shock causes inflation to rise and output to fall, and triggers
a contractionary response of monetary policy (see figure 1(c)).
With the optimal money-growth rule, the impulse responses from government-spending shocks
change considerably (see figure 2(b)). In agreement with the findings of Blanchard and Perotti
(2002), there is a rise in both consumption and output. The fact that the deviation of investment
from its steady state widens indicates that the model is incapable of generating a realistic mecha-
nism for crowding out. The noticeable aspect of the responses under a money-growth rule is that
the changes in money holdings are very small. This does not prevent the responses from showing
an adequate level of persistence.
The opportunistic monetary policy rule makes the short-term rate rise after a positive pro-
ductivity shock (see figure 3(a)). The initial increase in the interest rate is lower than both the
increse in output and the fall of the inflation rate. This causes output to fall more slowly than
under the standard Taylor rule. Inflation converges to its deterministic steady state more quickly
though. Since bond holding increase, the rental rate of capital falls. The nonlinear response of
price investment contemplates an increase more gradual than under the standard rule followed by
a persistent decline. After a government-spending shock, the short-term interest rate falls by less
than the increase in output (see figure 3(b)). This pushes the demand for money upward, and pre-
vents consumption from keeping on growing through the wealth effect after the initial increase.
The opportunistic central bank lowers the policy rate also in response to a positive markup shock
(see figure 3(c)). In this case, however, both real wages fall and consumption fall.
Table V reports some selected statistics for the model economy subject to all the type of
shocks. The opportunistic rule for monetary policy leads to very large swings especially for the
supply of labour (see panel (a)). This does not happen at the cost of large volatility of the short-
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term interest rate. The interest rate is the only variable with a negative correlation with output
(see panel (b)). Differently from the all the linear rules, the inflation rate is pro-cyclical under the
opportunistic monetary policy.
Our numerical results also include the optimized policy rules based on unconditional welfare
(see panel (b) of Tables II-IV). The welfare rankings of unconditional welfare are different from
those of conditional welfare. Ignoring the transitional effects of the monetary-policy rules leads
to a large overestimation of the welfare costs, as the index ∆U becomes very large for some of
the rules.
7.1. Opportunistic vs Deliberate Disinflation
Bomfim and Rudebusch (2000) formalize the distinction between opportunistic and deliberate
disinflation. Whereas in the former the central bank waits for exogenous shocks to bring about a
favourable output-inflation tradeoff, the latter prescribes an explicit path of disinflation. In prac-
tice, also the standard Taylor rule can can be argued to embody the idea of explicit disinflation, as
the policy rate is adjusted to deviation of current inflation from the target. However, comparing
between the standard and the opportunistic rule requires taking into consideration two different
inflation targets. In light of this, we formalize the deliberate approach to disinflation as a modifi-
cation of the standard Taylor rule
log
[
it
i¯
]
= αpi
[
pit
p˜it
]
+ αy log
[
yt
y¯
]
+ αR log
[
it
it−1
]
where the inflation target takes the form
p˜it := (1− λ)p¯i + λpit−1
The weight λ on inherited inflation is calibrated to 0.5 like for the opportunistic rule.
The qualitative responses of the model economy under deliberate disinflation are very similar
to those emerging under the standard Taylor rule. The main difference is that, with deliberate
disinflation, monetary policy responds more strongly to all types of shocks than with the standard
rule. This causes both investment and capital to fall in the cases of a productivity shock (see figure
4(a)) and a government-spending shock (see figure 4(b)). Table II shows that the policy rule for
deliberate disinflation achieves a conditional welfare level higher than that of the rest of the linear
rules. However that happens at the cost of a large variability in consumption (see panel (a)). A
comparison with panel (a) of Table III shows that deliberate disinflation is a preferable strategy
with respect to the opportunistic approach. This result can be motivated in the following.
Our model is calibrated in such a way that the stochastic fluctuations around the deterministic
steady state is small. This implies that there is a limited scope for exploiting the favourable
exogenous conditions in the reduction of the inflation rate. As a consequence, the benefits from
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the nonlinearity in the opportunistic rule are not as large as in models like those proposed by
Aksoy, Orphanides, Small, Wilcox, and Wieland (2003).
7.2. A comparison with ad-hoc loss functions
A natural benchmark for comparing policy rules that maximize conditional welfare is the opti-
mization of ad-hoc loss functions for the central. We start out by considering a one-period loss
function whereby the central bank aims to minimize a weighted average of unconditional standard
deviations of selected macroeconomic variables
Lopt = φpiVAR [pˆit] + (1− φpi)VAR [yˆt] + φiVAR
[ˆ
it
]
(8)
We also compute loss-minimizing policies according to an intertemporal loss function
Lintt =
∞∑
t=0
(
φpiVAR [pˆit|s0] + (1− φpi)VAR [yˆt|s0] + φiVAR
[ˆ
it|s0
])
(9)
that depends on the second moments VAR [·|s0] conditional on the initial state vector s0.1 Fol-
lowing Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), we assume φi = 0.2.
Since there is no closed-form solution for the infinite summation, we apply the computational
strategy outlined in section 6.1 and approximate the summations in two steps. First, the model is
solved over each point of a grid including the parameters of both the policy rules and the inflation
weight φpi. Then, the second-order solution of the model is simulated for 2000 periods, and the
discounted sum of the per-period losses is calculated.
Tables VI and VII reports the optimized policy rules for the loss function 8 and 9, respectively.
Two points emerge. First, the rankings of the policy rules according to the minimized losses are
different from those of the microfounded welfare function. Second, differently from the maxi-
mization of the intertemporal utility, the opportunistic rule for monetary policy produces welfare
tens of times larger than for the linear Taylor rules.
7.3. Robustness exercise
In what follows, we propose two robustness checks of the previous results. We consider optimized
monetary policy for the utility-based criterion with price rigidity higher than baseline (φP = 90),
and with a lower degree of monopolistic competition (θ = 2). As prices become more rigid, the
welfare levels achieved by linear rules show no substantial change. The interesting point is that
there is a sizeable improvement in the welfare level achieved by the opportunistic monetary policy.
A comparison between Tables VIII and IX shows that the less monopolistically-competitive the
1It is interesting to consider the case where the weight on the output objective is different from 1− φpi .
We impose the restriction 1−φpi on the output objective for the mere purpose of limiting the computational
costs.
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economy, the more desirable is the adoption of opportunistic disinflation with respect to the linear
Taylor rules. Finally, the optimized opportunistic rule is robust to increases in the degree of
history dependence (λ) of the intermediate inflation target.
8. FINAL REMARKS
In the present paper we studied the operational performance of a specific class of non-linear rules,
here shortly defined as opportunistic, in comparison with traditional linear Taylor’s type monetary
policy rule. Our results show that opportunistic rules allow to reach a policy configuration which
is - in terms of both conditional and unconditional welfare measure - better with respect to the
traditional approaches. The disadvantage of the opportunistic rule is given by the large labor
supply fluctuations, which remains lower than other linear rules where central bank commits to a
pre-specified path for disinflation (deliberate disinflation).
Overall, our results suggest that the opportunistic/nonlinear approach to monetary policy of-
fers a better control on the distortions derived from price rigidities, without inducing a large
depressionary effect on aggregate activity. Under this view, the opportunistic approach can be
thought as a rationale for the ’flexibility with judgment’ approach to monetary policy suggested
by Svensson (2005). However, we are perfectly aware that this approach should be further quali-
fied by extending to a richer framework with additional shocks and source of stickiness, both on
the real and the nominal side.
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APPENDIX 1: MODEL EQUATIONS
The system of first-order conditions is
λt = u−1t (1− `t)ξ(1−
1
σ ) ac
− 1µ
it
λtwt = uit (1− `t)ξ(1−
1
σ )−1
λt
Pt
= u−1t (1− `t)ξ(1−
1
σ ) (1− a)m−
1
µ
it
1
Pt
+ βEt
λt+1
Pt+1[
qt + φK
(
invt
kt
)3]
λt = µt − β (1− δ)Etµt+1
βEtµt+1 = λt
[
1 +
3φK
2
(
invit
kit
)2]
λt = βRtEt
λt+1
pit+1
(1− α)mct yt +Φt
`t
= wt
αmct
yt +Φt
kt
= qt
(1− θ)yt − φP (pit − pi) yt
pit−1
+ θmctyt + βEt
λt+1
λt
[φP (pit+1 − pi)pit+1yt+1] = 0
ut :=
[
ac
µ−1
µ
t + (1− a) (mt)
µ−1
µ
]( µµ−1 )(1− 1σ )
The model is closed with the simple rules for monetary and fiscal policy, the goverment flow budget
constraint, the laws of motion for the exogenous shocks, and the aggregate resource constraint for the
economy.
APPENDIX 2: STATE-SPACE FORM
Suppose that the first-order conditions of a model economy can be arranged as
EtH (et+1, et, xt+1, xt|σ) = 0 (A2.1)
where y is a vector of co-state variables. The state variables are collected in x
xt :=
[
x1,t
x2,t
]
with vectors of endogenous state variables x1,t, and exogenous state variables x2,t
x2,t+1 = Λ1x2,t + Λ2σt+1
with matrices Λ1 and Λ2. The scalar σ > 0 is known.
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004) show that the coefficients of the solutions on the terms linear and
quadratic of the state vector are certainty-equivalent. As a result, the approximate solution is
eˆt = Dxˆt +
1
2
Gxˆt ⊗ xˆt + 12Hσ
2
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xˆt+1 = D∗xˆt +
1
2
G∗xˆt ⊗ xˆt + 12H
∗σ2 + σNσt+1
where hats denote deviations from the deterministic steady state.
We define
x1,t = [kt Rt−1 dt−1 mt−1 yt−1 pit−1]
′
x2,t = [zt Φt gt]
′
et =
[
yt Rt dt mct invt ct mt pit `t qt wt λt µt τ lst
]′
APPENDIX 3: COMPUTING CONDITIONAL MOMENTS
Kim, Kim, Schaumburg, and Sims (2003) suggest that using the expressions of the full second-order
approximation for computing conditional moments recursively introduces spurious higher-order terms.
This problem can be avoided by exploiting the linear (first-order) part of the solution. Let eˆ(2)t denote the
full second-order solution, and eˆ(1)t denote the linear part. Following Paustian (2003), we can re-write the
system of solutions[
eˆ
(2)
t
eˆ
(1)
t ⊗ eˆ(1)t
]
=M1
[
xˆ
(2)
t
xˆ
(1)
t ⊗ xˆ(1)t
]
+K1 (A3.1)
[
xˆ
(2)
t+1
xˆ
(1)
t+1 ⊗ xˆ(1)t+1
]
=M2
[
xˆ
(2)
t
xˆ
(1)
t ⊗ xˆ(1)t
]
+K2 + ut+1 (A3.2)
Define
Xt =
(
xˆ
(2)
t
xˆ
(1)
t ⊗ xˆ(1)t
)
Yt =
(
eˆ
(2)
t
eˆ
(1)
t ⊗ eˆ(1)t
)
Equations A3.2 and A3.1 can be re-written by repeated substitution as
Xt+k =Mk2Xt +
k−1∑
i=0
M i2(K2 + ut+k−i)
Yt+k =M1Xt+k +K1 = K1 +M1Mk2Xt +
k−1∑
i=0
M1M
i
2(K2 + ut+k−i)
The expectation conditional on an initial state vector takes the form
E (Yt+k|Xt) = K1 +M1Mk2Xt +
k−1∑
i=0
M1M
i
2K2
The conditional variance can be computed from
Yt+k − E (Yt+k|Xt) =
k−1∑
i=0
M1M
i
2ut+k−i
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Cov(Yt+k|Xt) = E
{
[Yt+k − E (Yt+k|Xt)] [Yt+k − E (Yt+k|Xt)]′ |Xt
}
=
k−1∑
i=0
M1M
i
2Σu
(
M1M
i
2
)′
where Σu := E(utu′t).
In what follows, we report the computations of Σu. Paustian (2003) shows that ut takes the form
ut =
(
σNt
σ2 (N ⊗N) (vec(I)− t ⊗ t)
)
The mean of ut is Eut = 0. Since t v N(0, I), we have the following
E3it = 0
Eitjtkt = 0
if any of the indices i, j, k are different. This gives
σ2E (Nt′tN
′) = σ2NN ′
σ3E
{
(Nt) [(N ⊗N) (vec(I)− t ⊗ t)]′
}
=
= σ3E {(Nt) (vec(I)′ − ′t ⊗ ′t) (N ′ ⊗N ′)} = 0
Finally
σ4E
{
[(N ⊗N) (vec(I)− t ⊗ t)] [(N ⊗N) (vec(I)− t ⊗ t)]′
}
=
= σ4 (N ⊗N)E{[(vec(I)− t ⊗ t)] [(vec(I)− t ⊗ t)]′} (N ⊗N)′
where
E
{
[(vec(I)− t ⊗ t)] [(vec(I)− t ⊗ t)]′
}
=
= E {vec(I)vec(I)′ + t′t ⊗ t′t − (t ⊗ t) vec(I)′ − vec(I) (t ⊗ t)} =
= E (t′t ⊗ t′t)− vec(I)vec(I)′ =
= 2vec(I)vec(I)′
The variance matrix Ξ of ξt is
Eξtξ
′
t =M1E
(
σNt
σ2 (N ⊗N) (vec(I)− t ⊗ t)
)(
σNt
σ2 (N ⊗N) (vec(I)− t ⊗ t)
)′
M ′1 =
=M1
(
σ2NN ′ 0
0 2σ4 (N ⊗N) vec(I)vec(I)′ (N ⊗N)′
)
M ′1
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TABLE I:
CALIBRATION OF THE MODEL
Description Parameter Value
Subjective discount factor β 0.9966
Weight on leisure objective ξ 0.001
Share of consumption objective a 0.99
Interest elasticity µ 0.39
Coefficient of relative risk aversion 1/σ 3
Share of labour effort ` 1/4
Investment-output ratio i¯/y¯ 0.25
Capital-output ratio k¯/y¯ 10.4
Money-output ratio m¯/y¯ 0.44
Steady-state inflation p¯i 1.042(1/4)
Adjustment cost of prices φP 60
Adjustment cost of capital φK 433
Capital depreciation rate δ 0.024
Capital elasticity of intermediate output α 0.33
Elasticity of substitution of interm. goods θ 10
Persistence of productivity shock ρz 0.98
Steady state of productivity shock z 1
Standard dev. of productivity shock σ2z 0.055
Persistence of markup shock ρΦ 0.911
Standard dev. of markup shock σ2Φ 0.141
Persistence of government-spending shock ρG 0.97
Standard dev. of government-spending shock σG 0.1
Public spending-output ratio g¯/y¯ 0.148
Weight on objective of inherited inflation λ 0.5
Baseline parameter on fiscal-policy rule ψ1 0.8
Baseline parameter on fiscal-policy rule ψ2 0
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TABLE II:
OPTIMAL LINEAR TAYLOR RULES
(a) Conditional Welfare
αpi αy αR ψ1 W0 %∆c %∆E %∆V
Standard rule 2.8 1.0 1.0 0.2 -91.4098* 3.3318 -9.1087 13.6871
Rule in first difference 2.8 1.0 1.0 0.2 -91.4098* 3.3318 -9.1087 13.6871
Forward-looking rule 1.2 0.2 0.4 0.8 -91.4096 3.3315 -9.1085 13.6866
Deliberate disinflation 1.2 1.0 0.2 0.0 -86.99 -6.41 -98.62 670
(b) Unconditional Welfare
αpi αy αR ψ1 W %∆U
Standard rule 1.2 1.0 0.0 0.2 -3.35 1.2e4
Rule in first difference 1.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 -0.12 -84.81
Forward-looking rule 3.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 -3.378 1.2e4
Deliberate disinflation 1.4 1.0 0.4 0.2 0.001 -99.99
Legend: *The welfare levels achieved by the standard rule and the rule in first difference
differ only at the seventh digit.
28 M. MARZO, I. STRID AND P. ZAGAGLIA
TABLE III:
OPTIMAL OPPORTUNISTIC POLICY RULES
(a) Conditional Welfare
κ0 κ1 κ3 ψ1 W0 %∆c %∆E %∆V
0.0 5.0 1.0 0.0 -89.26 -1.48 -70.45 233
(b) Unconditional Welfare
κ0 κ1 κ2 ψ1 W %∆U
0.0 3.2 0.0 0.0 -3.41 1.2e4
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TABLE IV:
OPTIMAL MONEY-GROWTH RULE
(a) Conditional Welfare
ρm ψ1 W0 %∆c %∆E %∆V
0.6 0.0 -90.21 0.64 -51.23 106
(b) Unconditional Welfare
ρm ψ1 W %∆U
0.7 0.0 -3.40 1.2e4
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TABLE V:
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
(a) Standard deviation (%)
yt pit Rt kt ct `t
Standard rule 2.22 0.28 0.28 0.73 3.30 7.25
Rule in first difference 2.22 0.28 0.28 0.73 3.30 7.25
Forward-looking rule 2.23 0.26 0.26 0.75 3.30 7.25
Deliberate disinflation 1.46 46.44 43.94 7.45 2.38 17.01
Money-growth rule 17.25 10.82 0.02 17.67 17.04 33.59
Opportunistic rule 32.58 19.65 0.85 1.69 35.56 60.93
(b) Correlation with output
yt pit Rt kt ct `t
Standard rule 1 -1.00 -0.99 0.72 0.89 -0.80
Rule in first difference 1 -1.00 -0.99 0.72 0.89 -0.80
Forward-looking rule 1 -0.99 -0.99 0.72 0.89 -0.79
Deliberate disinflation 1 0.91 0.88 0.34 -0.21 0.66
Money-growth rule 1 0.92 0.99 0.35 0.99 0.68
Opportunistic rule 1 0.93 -0.47 0.26 0.99 0.83
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TABLE VI:
OPTIMAL POLICY RULES FOR THE AD-HOC LOSS FUNCTION 8
αpi αy αR ψ1 φpi Lop
Standard rule 2.8 0.6 1.0 0.2 1.0 0.0013
Rule in first difference 3.0 0.2 0.8 0.6 1.0 -0.0043
Forward-looking rule 1.6 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.0 0.0012
Deliberate disinflation 1.8 0.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0014
κ0 κ1 κ2 ψ1 φpi Lop
Opportunistic rule 0.6 3.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.093
ρm ψ1 φpi Lop
Money-growth rule 0.0 0.0 1.00 0.11
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TABLE VII:
OPTIMAL POLICY RULES FOR THE AD-HOC LOSS FUNCTION 9
αpi αy αR ψ1 φpi Lint
Standard rule 1.1 0 0 0.2 0 1.5177
Rule in first difference 1.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 2.4755
Forward-looking rule 1.1 0 0 0.2 0 4.2512
Deliberate disinflation 1.3 0.2 0 0.5 0.5 3.2257
κ0 κ1 κ2 ψ1 φpi Lint
Opportunistic rule 0 3.0 0 0.4 1.0 38.16
ρm ψ1 φpi Lop
Money-growth rule 0 0 1.0 39.81
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TABLE VIII:
ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS ON OPTIMAL LINEAR TAYLOR RULES
(a) φP = 90
αpi αy αR ψ1 W0 %∆c %∆E %∆V
Standard rule 2.8 1.0 1.0 0.2 -91.407 3.335 -9.110 13.6923
Rule in first difference 2.8 1.0 1.0 0.8 -91.405 3.332 -9.114 13.6941
Forward-looking rule 1.2 0.2 0.4 0.8 -91.409 3.337 -9.111 13.6958
(a) θ = 2
αpi αy αR ψ1 W0 %∆c %∆E %∆V
Standard rule 1.2 1.0 0.2 0.6 -58.745 -3.522 -13.662 11.7445
Rule in first difference 1.2 1.0 0.2 0.6 -58.744 -3.521 -13.668 11.7535
Forward-looking rule 1.2 0.8 0.2 0.4 -58.740 -3.540 -13.645 11.7017
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TABLE IX:
ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS ON OPTIMAL OPPORTUNISTIC POLICY RULES
κ0 κ1 κ3 ψ1 W0 %∆c %∆E %∆V
φP = 90 0.0 5.0 1.0 0.0 -88.48 -3.20 -77.68 333
θ = 2 0.0 5.0 1.0 0.0 -45.06 -43.25 -97.67 234
λ = 0.2 0.0 5.0 1.0 0.0 -89.26 -1.48 -70.45 233
λ = 0.3 0.0 5.0 1.0 0.0 -89.26 -1.48 -70.45 233
λ = 0.4 0.0 5.0 1.0 0.0 -89.26 -1.48 -70.45 233
λ = 0.6 0.0 5.0 1.0 0.0 -89.26 -1.48 -70.45 233
λ = 0.7 0.0 5.0 1.0 0.0 -89.26 -1.48 -70.45 233
λ = 0.8 0.0 5.0 1.0 0.0 -89.26 -1.48 -70.45 233
λ = 0.9 0.0 5.0 1.0 0.0 -89.26 -1.48 -70.45 233
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TABLE X:
ROBUSTNESS FOR THE MONEY-GROWTH RULE
(a) φP = 90
ρm ψ1 W0 %∆c %∆E %∆V
0.7 0.0 -89.79 -30.01 -71.58 146
(b) θ = 2
ρm ψ1 W0 %∆c %∆E %∆V
0.0 0.0 -52.44 -23.14 -87.48 514
